Third Circuit Case Explores Nooks and Crannies of Trade Secret Misappropriation Under Pennsylvania Law

A July 27, 2010 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-1510, upheld an injunction preventing a senior executive from commencing employment at Hostess Brands, Inc., a bakery rival to the plaintiff Bimbo. The decision is notable in that the Court enjoined Mr. Botticella’s employment, in the absence of any non-competition agreement, on the basis that there was a “substantial likelihood,” but not an “inevitability,” that Mr. Botticella would disclose or use Bimbo’s trade secrets in the course of his planned employment at Hostess.

Mr. Botticella was employed at Bimbo from 2001 through January 13, 2010 as its Vice President of Operations for California, and he signed a “Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Invention Assignment Agreement” with Bimbo on March 13, 2009. As one of Bimbo’s senior executives, Mr. Botticella had access to a broad range of confidential information about Bimbo’s products and business strategy. Notably, Mr. Botticella was one of only seven people to possess all of the knowledge necessary to replicate independently Bimbo’s popular line of Thomas’ English Muffins.

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that Bimbo was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim of misappropriation of trade secrets under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“PUTSA”). The Circuit Court made it clear that it was basing its opinion not upon a theory of “inevitable disclosure,” but rather upon the PUTSA’s proscription of threatened misappropriation. The Circuit Court rejected Mr. Botticella’s argument that an injunction should only issue if Bimbo could show that it would be “virtually impossible” for him to perform his new job at Hostess without disclosing Bimbo trade secrets.

The Court found that the District Court’s injunction was amply supported by evidence adduced at the preliminary injunction hearing; in short, Mr. Botticella was not a “good leaver” when resigning from Bimbo. Mr. Botticella accepted the Hostess position on October 15, 2009, but agreed to begin work in January 2010. During the intervening time, he remained fully engaged in his work (with its attendant exposure to confidential information) at Bimbo, and did not inform Bimbo of his intention to resign until January 4, 2010. The District Court found that Mr. Botticella had accessed highly sensitive Bimbo information via his computer in his last days at Bimbo and had likely copied such information onto external storage devices, and that his explanation at his deposition of such conduct was “confusing at best” and “not credible.”

The Third Circuit also noted that the District Court was entitled to make an adverse inference against Botticella because he did not testify at the preliminary injunction hearing.
 

Eighth Circuit Affirms Award Of $1,369,921 As Liquidated Damages In No-Compete Case

Applying Missouri law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed an award of $1,369,921 in liquidated damages stemming from the alleged violation of non-solicitation agreements by four former employees of accounting firm Mayer Hoffman McCann. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C. v. Thomas L. Barton et al., Case No. 09-2061 (8th Cir. August 11, 2010). In pertinent part, these agreements provided that for two years following the termination of employment, the employees could not solicit clients and employees of their former employer. The agreements also contained a liquidated damages provision.

The Court held that the two year duration was reasonable and further held that the absence of a geographic restriction was not a problem, because “a customer restriction may substitute for an explicit geographical restriction.”

Regarding the liquidated damages provision, the Court explained that

the issue here is whether the parties intended the provision to be a form of recoverable compensation – liquidated damages – or an unenforceable penalty provision meant to compel performance. In order to distinguish between the two, we ask whether: ‘(1) the amount fixed as damages [is] a reasonable forecast for the harm caused by the breach; and (2) the harm [is] of a kind difficult to accurately estimate.’

Because the Court found that both requirements were met in this case, it affirmed the trial court’s award of $1,369,921 in liquidated damages, calculated based upon gross billings to 124 former clients who moved their business after being improperly solicited.
 

California Employer Held Liable For "Honoring" A Prior Employer's Unenforceable No-Compete

Co-authored by Ted A. Gehring.

On July 30, 2010, in Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc., the California Court of Appeal (2nd District) held that an employee could state a claim for wrongful termination against her subsequent employer when that employer terminated her after having been informed by her former employer that the employee was subject to a non-compete clause.  The decision will have important consequences for companies with California employees in industries where non-competition and non-solicitation agreements are common.

The plaintiff, Rosemary Silguero,  began employment with Floor Seal Technology Inc. (“FST”)  in 2003 as a sales representative.  In 2007, FST threatened to terminate her employment unless she signed a confidentiality agreement which contained a non-competition clause that prohibited her from all sales activities for 18 months following either her departure or termination from FST.  Silgureo's employment was subsequently terminated by FST.  She was then hired by Creteguard Inc.  FST contacted Creteguard requesting its cooperation in enforcing the confidentially agreement.  Creteguard then terminated Silguero’s employment, citing the non-competition clause.  Notably, in terminating her, Creteguard acknowledged the invalidity of the non-competition agreement, but noted it was terminating Silguero "to keep the same respect and understanding" with Creteguard's "colleagues" in the same industry.

Silguero filed suit against Creteguard, alleging wrongful termination.  She also sued FST in a separate lawsuit, alleging that FST had intentionally interfered with her contract with Creteguard.

Silguero contended that the non-competition agreement with FST was void under California Business and Professions Code Section 16600 and that her termination by Creteguard pursuant to that agreement was against public policy.   Creteguard demurred, arguing that that there was no clearly delineated public policy prohibiting an employer from honoring a non-competition agreement by an employee and a former employer.  Creteguard argued that if there was any violation of public policy, the violation was by FST.  The trial court granted Creteguard’s demurrer, finding it was not against public policy for a subsequent employer to honor a previous agreement entered into by an employee and former employer. Silguero appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Silguero's allegations supported a claim for wrongful termination pursuant to Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield.  In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the Court held that Section 16600 was a clear legislative declaration of a fundamental public policy that forbid discharge based on a non-competition agreement.  The Court of Appeal did not address Silguero's claims against FST.

Creteguard argued that, notwithstanding the legislative policy against non-competition agreements, nothing in Section 16600 evidenced any legislative intent to impose third-party liability.  Imposing liability on Creteguard for a violation of Section 16600, Creteguard argued, went beyond the legislative intent evidenced by Section 16600.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting that California courts had previously rejected as unenforceable "no-hire" agreements between employees.  The Court of Appeal found that Creteguard's desire to keep an "understanding" with its competitors in the industry operated as a no-hire agreement.

New York Court Upholds Trade Secrets Suit By Marsh

In a recent decision issued by the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, a lawsuit brought by Marsh USA Inc. against two former employees and a competitor was sustained in the face of the defendants’ challenge to the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action.  The decision is notable for its application of New York non-competition law to California residents, and Marsh’s inclusion of forum selection clauses and choice of law provisions in its agreements with the individual defendants appears to have enabled it to avoid the draconian effect of California law upon those individual’s non-compete agreements.

The decision denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, by Justice Bernard J. Fried, was entered on July 23, 2010 in the matter of Marsh USA Inc. v. Hamby, Index No. 600636/10.

The individual defendants, John A. Hamby and Lida Davidians, both reside in California and worked over five years in Marsh’s Entertainment Practice, in which they were senior employees.  The complaint alleges that Hamby and Davidians each breached several non-compete agreements, misappropriated confidential information, and unfairly competed when they went to work for DeWitt Stern Group, Inc. in late January 2010.  After their resignations, in short order, numerous clients terminated their relationship with Marsh and appointed DeWitt as their new insurance broker, and 8 of 20 employees of Marsh’s Los Angeles Entertainment Practice abruptly defected to DeWitt.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint first on the ground that the New York court is an inconvenient form.  The Court refused to dismiss on this ground, because both Hamby and Davidians had signed multiple agreements containing forum selection clauses and choice of law provisions that obligated the parties to litigate in New York, applying New York law.  Defendants’ arguments that connections to California outweighed connections to New York, and that California’s public policy would render the non-compete agreements void under California law, did not convince the New York court to dismiss.  The New York court noted, among other things, that a lawsuit commenced by defendants against Marsh in the Superior Court of the State of California, No. BC 430457, seeking a determination that the agreements were unenforceable under California Business and Professions Code Section 16600, was stayed upon Marsh’s motion, allowing the dispute to be heard in the New York court.

Defendants’ second motion to dismiss, for failure to state a cause of action, focused on Marsh’s allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets, which defendants argued were conclusory and did not identify what trade secrets had been stolen.  The New York court found that the defection of numerous Marsh employees and clients quickly following Hamby and Davidians’ resignations raised a strong enough inference of misappropriation of trade secrets, that the complaint would therefore survive the motion to dismiss.

Minimizing the Risk that a New Hire Will Lead to Trade Secret Litigation: Some Simple Preventive Steps

When hiring new employees, you can minimize the risk of inadvertently becoming embroiled in trade secret litigation by taking a few simple steps. First, new hires should be verbally instructed to be “good leavers” -- meaning that they should take absolutely nothing with them when heading out the door from their old job, and should return all property of their former employer at termination, including laptops, cell phones, Blackberries, thumb drives, and any property kept at home. Similarly, no e-mails or electronically stored documents or information should be retained on personal computers, thumb drives, etc. Second, because offer letters can become litigation exhibits, they should instruct new hires not to bring, distribute, or use any confidential information, trade secrets, or any other property of a former employer. Third, offer letters should require new hires to confirm in writing that the new hire has reviewed the duties and responsibilities of the new position and can perform them without using or disclosing confidential or proprietary information of another entity and without violating the terms of any applicable agreement. Finally, employee handbooks and/or confidentiality agreements/policies also should contain similar language prohibiting the use or distribution of confidential information or trade secrets of former employers. While such actions are no guarantee against trade secret litigation stemming from the hiring of a new employee, they will certainly lower the risks.

Update on the Limited Impact of the Illinois Appellate Court's Sunbelt Rentals Decision

As we noted in a blog post in October 2009, in Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Ehlers, 333 Ill.Dec. 791, 915 N.E.2d 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), an Illinois appellate court reexamined and rejected over thirty years of well-established precedent regarding the enforceability of restrictive covenants. Specifically, it rejected the “legitimate business interest” test long applied as a threshold issue by Illinois courts when deciding the enforceability of a restrictive covenant. At the time, we noted that the court either isolated itself from every other Illinois appellate court or took the first step in decreasing the traditional hostility with which Illinois courts treat restrictive covenants.

As of early December 2009, only one other court had cited to the Sunbelt decision. In that decision (which we discussed in an earlier blog post), federal district court judge Robert Gettleman declined to follow Sunbelt, noting that “[t]he Illinois Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and this court, however, have not rejected the applications of the legitimate business interest test.”

Since that time, there has been only one other published decision citing Sunbelt. In Rayco Management, Inc. v. Lancaster, No. 09 CH 18611, 2009 WL 6521389 (Cir. Ct. Cook Ct. Dec. 9, 2009), a trial judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County similarly declined to follow Sunbelt, concluding that he was bound by the precedent of the First District Appellate Court which still applies the “legitimate business interest” test.

Approximately nine months after Sunbelt was decided, no appellate court has issued a published decision addressing the holding of that decision and both lower courts that have been presented with a Sunbelt argument have declined to follow that decision absent direction from the appropriate appellate or higher level court. We will continue to monitor this issue, as it has significant ramifications on the enforceability of restrictive covenants in Illinois.
 

Quon May Hold Meaning For Private Employers Seeking Access to Private Communications

On June 17, 2010, in Ontario v. Quon, the United States Supreme Court decided that the City of Ontario, California could review the non-work-related text messages to and from a City police officer on a City-issued electronic pager. Because the opinion involved a governmental employer and was largely grounded in a 4th Amendment analysis, many private employers have paid Quon little attention. But that would be a mistake, especially for those facing trade secret and non-competition matters. Quickly accessing and collecting so-called “private communications” can play a vital role in amassing the evidence needed to support a restraining order or preliminary injunction. Despite the fact that much of the analysis in Quon would be irrelevant in the private employment context, the Supreme Court expressly held that the review of the officer’s personal text messages on the employer-issued pager “would be ‘regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context.’” (Slip op. at 16). Consequently, knowing what was done and how it was done in Quon may provide even private employers with a roadmap for approaching such issues, and then provide from the highest court in the land legal support for the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct.

Quon’s facts, and the assumptions that the Supreme Court made about them, are worth a brief review. First, the Court noted that the City “reserve[d] the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources,” but that the policy “did not apply, on its face, to text messaging.” Slip op. at 2. Further, “[a]lthough the Computer Policy did not cover text messages by its explicit terms, the City made clear to employees, including Quon,” through statements at various meetings and in a written memorandum that “[text] messages sent on the pagers ‘are considered e-mail messages. This means that [text] messages would fall under the City’s policy as public information and [would be] eligible for auditing.’” Id. at 3 (bracketed language in original). On the other hand, Quon argued that he could reasonably expect that his text messages would remain private based on the City’s past practice. Each pager issued to officers was allotted a limited number of characters sent or received each month. Id. at 2. According to Quon, the City told him that an audit of his text messages would be unnecessary if he paid the excess charges for any use that exceeded the monthly limit. Id. at 9. Because he paid for those excess charges, id. at 3, Quon argued that he had a reasonable expectation that the City would not review the contents of his text messages.

Rather than resolve this dispute, the Supreme Court assumed for the purpose of its analysis that “Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to him by the City,” slip op. at 12, yet nonetheless found that the City’s review of the personal text messages was appropriate and reasonable for the governmental employer acting without a warrant. Slip op. at 12-13. Important factors supporting the Court’s finding of reasonableness were (i) the City did not search any text-messages sent during off-duty hours; and (ii) the City searched only a sample – i.e., only two months of messages sent by Quon rather than all of the months during which he exceeded his monthly character allotment. The Court concluded that, despite any expectation of privacy, such a search was reasonable for a government employer and would have been “‘regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context.’” (Slip op. at 16).

Central to that conclusion was the concept that the recognition of an employee’s expectation of privacy was not tantamount to conceding that such privacy would remain wholly inviolate:

Even if he could assume some level of privacy would inhere in his messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages were in all circumstances immune from scrutiny. Quon was told that his messages were subject to auditing. As a law enforcement officer, he would or should have known that his actions were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that this might entail an analysis of his on-the-job communications. Under the circumstances, a reasonable employee would be aware that sound management principles might require the audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used. …From [the Ontario Police Department]’s perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy expectation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life. OPD’s audit of messages on Quon’s employer-provided pager was not nearly as intrusive as a search of his personal e-mail account or pager, or a wiretap on his home phone line, would have been. That the search did reveal intimate details of Quon’s life does not make it unreasonable, for under the circumstances a reasonable employer would not expect that such a review would intrude on such matters. The search was permissible in its scope. (slip op. at 14).

The Court expressly noted that, given the employee’s limited privacy expectation (based on the City’s electronic communication policy, the fact he was told that his text messages might be audited and the fact that his position as a police officer might require an analysis of his on-the-job communications) the government employer would not reasonably to expect that an employee would place highly private details of his life into messages on his employer’s physical device. (slip op. at 14). When the Court later expressly concludes that such a “search would be ‘regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context,’” the Supreme Court can be said to be validating for a private employer that same right reasonably to expect that an employee would avoid placing highly private details of his life into messages on his employer’s physical device when the employee had been advised his employer might audit such communications.

In the wake of decisions like Stengart v. Loving Care [see previous blog post here], where the New Jersey Supreme Court dictated much less latitude for employers, even the brief mentions in Quon that reference private employers are welcome ones.

There are some practical tips for employer communication policies. Such policies should be all inclusive – covering cell phones, e-mail, text messaging, etc. The fact that the written policy in this case did not expressly cover text messages caused some confusion. Also, although the Supreme Court tried to state that it was not opining as to how advances in communication technology may impact an employee’s expectation of privacy, it went on to make several such statement (much to the dismay of Justice Scalia). For example, the Court observed that, on the one hand, the pervasive use of cell phones and text message means that some people may consider them to be “necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification” which would strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy; but the Court also noted that “the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their own.” (slip op. at 11). This later point also provides some practical guidance—perhaps employers should add to their electronic communications policy a statement along the lines of the following: An employee who desires to send or receive personal communications unreviewable under this policy should purchase and use his/her own cell phone/text messaging device and service plan.
 

 

A Pennsylvania No-Compete Primer

In Pharmethod, Inc. v. Caserta, __ F.3d __ (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction enforcing a no-compete based on the trial judge’s failure to fully explain his factual and legal conclusions. The case is noteworthy because the Third Circuit provided what amounts to a primer on Pennsylvania non-compete law to help guide the district court on remand. Here is a summary of the Third Circuit’s guidance:

• Restrictive covenants are not favored in Pennsylvania and, due to the inherently unequal bargaining positions of employer and employee, such agreements are closely scrutinized. The court is required to balance the employer’s protectable business interest against the employee’s interest in earning a living in his or her chosen profession, and then balance the result against the public interest.

• In balancing such equities, some Pennsylvania courts are reluctant to enforce restrictive covenants against an employee who was involuntarily terminated.

• In Pennsylvania, post-employment restrictive covenants are enforceable if: (i) they are incident to an employment relationship between the parties; (ii) the restrictions imposed by the covenant are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer; and (iii) the restrictions imposed are reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent.

• Legitimate business interests that may be protected by a restrictive covenant include protecting trade secrets, confidential information, good will or unique/extraordinary skills. Eliminating competition or gaining an economic advantage do not constitute legitimate business interests.

• Geographic restrictions must also be reasonable. Courts will uphold restrictive covenants with broad geographic limits only where the employee’s duties and customers were equally broad.

• Pennsylvania courts may “blue pencil” restrictive covenants by granting enforcement that is limited to those portions which are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer. However, Pennsylvania case law favors non-enforcement of gratuitously overbroad restrictive covenants.
 

The "Authorized Access" Issue Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Earlier this year, Aon Risk Services Northeast Inc. (“Aon”) brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Marsh USA Inc., Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. (together, “Marsh”), and three former employees. In its Amended Complaint, Aon asserted that the defendants transferred a “pre-packaged book of business” to Marsh, primarily by the former employees’ “illegal downloading of Aon proprietary trade secret information.” Aon asserted a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. §1030, against the three former employees, and asserted nine common law claims, including misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract and unfair competition, under New York state law against Marsh and the former employees.

The Court issued an Order granting an application by defendants to dismiss all of the state law claims, on the grounds that they are different from and substantially predominate over Aon’s lone federal claim under the CFAA. See Aon Risk Servs. Northeast, Inc. v. Kornblau, 10 Civ. 2244 (RMB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38140 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2010). The state law claims were dismissed without prejudice to their renewal in an appropriate forum. On April 23, 2010, Aon re-filed its nine state law claims in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, Index No. 601058/10.

The three former employees have now moved to dismiss the only remaining claim, under the CFAA. In their brief, they argue that the CFAA claim is deficient because they did not exceed their authorized access to Aon’s computers. The former employees state that the CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to protected computers, not unauthorized use of those computers and the confidential information thereon. This issue -- the application of the CFAA to alleged employee computer abuse -- is the subject of numerous court decisions across the country, some of which interpret the CFAA’s “without authorization” language broadly, and some of which interpret it narrowly, as the former Aon employees urge.

The procedural history of the case so far shows that Aon’s pairing of the CFAA claim with its state law claims -- the gravamen of its Complaint -- has not worked out well. If the CFAA claim was included in order to secure federal jurisdiction over the dispute, it was unsuccessful; the Court’s Order dismissing the state law claims led Aon to commence a second action in state court. While the Court has yet to rule on the former employees’ motion to dismiss the CFAA claim, Aon’s CFAA claim may lack the requisite allegations to withstand the motion to dismiss. If so, Aon’s efforts to go on the offensive against the alleged unfair competitors will result in two setbacks straight out of the gate.
 

Drafting Enforceable Non-Competition Agreements in Illinois

Peter A. Steinmeyer and Jake Schmidt recently published an updated and expanded guide to drafting enforceable non-competition agreements in Illinois. The article, which was first published by the Illinois State Bar Association's publication "The Corporate Lawyer," can be downloaded by clicking here. As updated, it addresses the Illinois Appellate Court's Sunbelt Rentals decision and the proposed "Illinois Covenants Not to Compete Act."