Georgia Legislature Proposes Dramatic Changes To Restrictive Covenant Laws

*Co-authored with Alexis M. Downs.

If eventually passed, proposed Georgia House Bill 173 will dramatically alter Georgia restrictive covenant law as we now know it. In short, this proposed legislation purports to significantly ease the employer’s burden when it comes to the enforcement of non-competition, non-solicitation and non-recruitment covenants in Georgia, where such restrictive covenants have been notoriously difficult to draft and enforce. HB 173 will become law only after ratification of a proposed amendment to the Georgia Constitution scheduled to be on the ballot during the November 2010 general election.

As a matter of public policy, the Georgia courts currently refuse to enforce restrictive covenants which do not include strict limitations as to duration, territory, and scope. Whether or not a limitation will be considered reasonable is currently governed by Georgia common law which has evolved over several years on a case by case basis. This has resulted in a piecemeal set of amorphous and relatively stringent rules which make the enforceability of restrictive covenants extremely difficult and quite unpredictable. Furthermore, under the current Georgia law, the courts are forbidden from “blue-penciling” or, in other words, modifying invalid provisions within employee non-compete and non-solicitation agreements. Finally, Georgia courts will automatically invalidate non-solicitation covenants if the employer’s non-compete covenant is in any way invalid, and vice versa.

Taking what could be referred to as an “about-face” from current law, HB 173 states its purpose is to “serve the legitimate purpose of protecting legitimate business interests and creating an environment that is favorable to attracting commercial enterprises to Georgia and keeping existing businesses within the state.” In support of this stated purpose, the proposed legislation significantly softens the oftentimes challenging geographic, temporal, and subject matter limitations currently required by Georgia courts. To this end, the Bill defines several frequently misapplied terms, and offers presumptively valid and relatively liberal time frames for certain types of restrictions. For example, a two year duration is presumed reasonable as to a restraint of a former employee’s ability to compete with an employer within a specific geographic area. A restraint of up to three years is considered reasonable for non-solicitation and non-recruitment agreements. The proposed legislation is also more lenient in regard to scope, eliminating the historical requirement that employers specifically link the scope of prohibited post-employment competition with what are oftentimes unpredictable future duties and responsibilities of the signatory employee. As such, contrary to the current law, the proposed legislation dictates that, “any good faith estimate of the activities, products and services” will suffice so as to define the scope of the proscribed post-employment competition. Also, contrary to a recent Georgia Supreme Court ruling, the proposed legislation dictates that in-term covenants (those which apply during the employment relationship as opposed to after) are not required to include specific limitations as to scope of activity, duration, or geographic territory. Finally, perhaps the most significant proposed change is that the courts will be directed to blue-pencil provisions found to be unenforceable. Thus, if a portion of a restrictive covenant is invalid, the courts will be able to narrow the restriction in question and, as a result, enforce any remaining partial provisions or covenants.

HB 173 was signed by Governor Purdue on April 29, 2009, and will become effective one day following ratification of a proposed amendment to the Georgia Constitution which would give the legislature the power to enact such laws. The need for a constitutional amendment stems from a 1991 decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in which a similar non-competition law was held unconstitutional under Article III of the Constitution of Georgia which reads: "The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract or agreement which may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect of defeating or lessening competition …". If the amendment is not ratified in the November 2010 general election, HB 173 will be automatically repealed.
 

Florida Appellate Court Reverses Temporary Injunction for Lack of Specificity

I recently reported on a decision of Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal in which the appellate court reversed the issuance of an ex parte temporary injunction because the order failed to specify why it was granted without notice to the other party.

In a recent case, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal ("DCA") reversed the issuance of a temporary injunction for a similar reason: it failed to specify with reasonable particularity the conduct being enjoined. The case is Angelino v. Santa Barbara Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 3D08-1066 (Fla. 3d DCA, February 18, 2009).

The case involved a business dispute between the appellant, Sabrina Angelino, and Santa Barbara Enterprises, LLC, each of whom owned a fifty percent interest in Starbridge Networks, LLC, which sells telecommunications products and related technical services. Santa Barbara alleged that Angelino and her husband set up two competing companies, SILA Networks, LLC and SILA Networks, C.A., through which they usurped business opportunities that belonged to Starbridge Networks. Santa Barbara also alleged that Angelino interfered with Starbridge Networks' relationships with its customers and suppliers.

In its order, the trial court found that Angelino, through SILA Networks, competed and interfered with Starbridge Networks' business relationships in Venezuela. The trial court therefore enjoined Angelino, both individually and as an employee of SILA Networks LLC, her agents, servants, employees and attorneys from: (a) competing against Starbridge Networks; (b) usurping Starbridge Networks' business opportunities, customers and suppliers; (c) using Starbridge Networks' proprietary information and technology; and (d) interfering with Starbridge Network's relationships with its customers and suppliers, including through the use of derogatory comments about Starbridge Networks, its officers, managers or employees.

The trial court also imposed a constructive trust. The trust encompassed any purchase orders, contracts or other business that Angelino, her agents, servants, employees and attorneys, may have obtained from Starbridge Networks' customers.

The Third DCA reversed both the injunction and the imposition of a constructive trust. Citing the Fifth DCA's decision in Clark v. Allied Assocs., Inc., 477 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), the court noted:

The trial court enjoined Angelino from competing against Starbridge Networks. But there is no mention of any acts that may be considered competitive in nature. The trial court enjoined Angelino from usurping Starbridge Networks' business opportunities, customers, and suppliers. There is no mention, however, of any customers and suppliers with whom Angelino may not compete. The trial court also enjoined Angelino from the use of Starbridge Networks' proprietary information and technology. There is no mention of any specifics upon which Angelino can rely to determine what information and technology he cannot use. This type of vague language is precisely the type that the district court contemplated in Clark, and we cannot uphold to support the entry of a temporary injunction.

The portion of the temporary injunction in which the trial court imposed a constructive trust is likewise overly broad. The trial court failed to mention with sufficient particularity “what purchase orders, contracts, or other business” Angelino is obligated to hold in a constructive trust. Angelino is left in doubt as to what he is required to do to comply with the trial court's directives. This portion of the injunction is thus defective.

The takeaway from this court is clear. When drafting a proposed temporary injunction order, attorneys should use precise language that makes it abundantly clear what the other side can and cannot do. Trial judges in the state court system are extremely busy, and they may not be inclined to tailor language to the specific facts of the case. But that is what is required to avoid the reversal of the injunction on appeal. The Fifth DCA's advice in Clark is worth reciting here:

An injunctive order should never be broader than is necessary to secure the injured party, without injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular case. The order should be adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be permissible and proper. Such an order should be confined within reasonable limitations and phrased in such language that its requirements can be met, without resert to portions of the record or facts outside the ‘four corners' of the injunction itself. One against whom an injunction is directed should not be left in doubt as to what he is required to do.

Clark, 477 So.2d at 477-78.